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ABSTRACT 
Did the impartiality of clinical trials play any role in their acceptance as regulatory 
standards for the safety and efficacy of drugs? According to the standard account of 
early British trials in the 1930s and 1940s, their impartiality was just rhetorical: the 
public demanded fair tests and statistical devices such as randomization created an 
appearance of neutrality. In fact, the design of the experiment was difficult to 
understand and the British authorities took advantage of it to promote their own 
particular interests. I claim that this account is based on a poorly defined concept of 
experimental fairness (derived from T. Porter’s ideas). I present an alternative approach 
in which a test would be impartial if it incorporates warrants of non-manipulability. 
With this concept, I reconstruct the history of British trials showing that they were 
indeed fair and this fairness played a role in their acceptance as regulatory yardsticks. 
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ON THE IMPARTIALITY OF EARLY BRITISH CLINICAL TRIALS 
 
1. THE CURRENT CONSENSUS ON BRITISH CLINICAL TRIALS 
In this paper I want to re-examine the process that led to the acceptance of 
randomized clinical trials (RCTs) as a regulatory yardstick in Britain in the first half of 
the 20th century. RCTs are an experimental design aimed at assessing the comparative 
effects of, at least, two medical treatments on two (or more) groups of patients. The 
statistical analysis of the difference between the outcomes in the groups should reveal if 
there is any significant different showing a superior safety and efficacy of one of the 
treatments regarding the other(s). Throughout the second half of the 20th century and up 
to our days, RCTs became the testing standard for pharmaceutical agencies, so that 
succeeding in at least two of them is a pre-requisite for authorizing the commercial use 
of new compounds in Western countries.  
In this sense, RCTs illustrate, once more, how statistically based decision criteria 
have been successfully implemented in public policy. We owe to Ted Porter’s Trust in 
numbers (1995) the current paradigm for the analysis of such processes. His main thesis 
was summarised by Hagendijk (1999, p.  630) as follows: 
The tendency towards quantitative and standardized measures in modern society 
is not so much a spin-off from the development of the natural sciences, as a part 
of the response of weak professional groups to external social and political 
pressures demanding accountability. 
According to Porter, in Western democracies at the turn of the 20th century, it 
wasn’t possible for public officials to accept individual expert judgement on the sole 
basis of personal trust in the members of a scientific elite. The experts gradually became 
professional bodies whose advice was delivered complying with impersonal rules and 
calculations in order to exclude bias and personal preferences. The more social pressure 
for unified and accountable expert advice, the more likely it was that quantification 
succeeded among social scientists. According to Porter, this social pressure was 
expressed in normative terms: scientific objectivity answered to “a moral demand for 
impartiality and fairness” (1995, p. 8) which arose in particular social settings. 
  
The current account of the origins of British RCTs is mostly framed in terms of 
Porter’s paradigm. There was a public demand for impartiality in drug testing that gave 
the opportunity to an emerging group of trialists to impose RCTs against alternative 
forms of assessment (mainly, expert clinical judgment). The thorny issue, in my view, is 
whether the purported impartiality of RCTs was real or just a mere rhetorical device to 
make their introduction acceptable. The standard account sides mostly with this latter 
interpretation: e.g., the analysis of the 1948 streptomycin trial in Britain shows that both 
the Ministry of Health and the medical community agreed to conduct it without any 
substantive understanding of its statistical rationale. The trial allowed the British health 
authorities to manage a scarce supply of streptomycin, a drug in high demand among 
tuberculose patients. Private contextual interests, rather than epistemic or ethical 
concerns, drove the organization and conduct of the first RCT1.  
Against this consensual account, I will claim that the impartiality of RCTs (their 
independence regarding the interests at stake in the experiment) played an effective role 
in the social acceptance of controlled clinical trials, first, and then RCTs in Britain. I 
think Porter is right in signalling the role impartiality plays in the processes leading to 
the public acceptance of statistical decision-making criteria. But we need a more precise 
concept of impartiality in order to decide whether these criteria were actually fair. And 
only at that point we may assess whether this impartiality contributed to the acceptance 
of this criteria. In the following section, I intend to sketch my own proposal in this 
respect. I contend that an experiment (such as an RCT) can be deemed impartial to the 
extent that it incorporates debiasing procedures that block self-interested manipulation 
of the outcome. I will introduce a number of distinctions that will allow me to analyse 
two episodes in the introduction of British RCTs.  
In section 3 I will discuss the antecedents of the Streptomycin trial (usually 
considered the first RCT worth its name), between 1920 and 1945. I am going to 
consider, on the one hand, the different interests at stake in the trials in order to make 
sense of the need of an impartial decision making process that could lead the concerned 
parties to an agreement. On the other hand, I will show how this necessity for 
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 This account is presented in a handful of excellent dissertations completed throughout the last fifteen 
years: namely Cox 1997, Edwards 2007, Toth 1998a, Yoshioka 1998a. This social approach has also been 
used in the American case: see Meldrum 1994. The reader should bear in mind that Yoshioka (1998b) has 
retreated somewhat from his thesis's heavy emphasis on administrative objectives, so my arguments will 
refer exclusively to his 1998a piece. 
  
impartiality was understood by the trialists, without a clear consensus on its 
implications. In section 4, there is a discussion of the standard account of the 
Streptomycin trial. I will argue that randomization provided the first real warrant of the 
impartiality of the experiment: rather than a mere rhetorical device to comfort the 
British public, I contend that it was a fair enough allocation procedure for all practical 
purposes and, despite the self-interested motives that led to its selection, the choice of 
randomization deserves all praise from the standpoint of the concept of impartiality 
presented in section 2. Moreover, this concept does not provide an ex post 
reconstruction of the process, but rather allows us to capture (and vindicate) the actual 
motivations of the agents involved. 
2. THE CONCEPT OF IMPARTIALITY 
I am going first to sketch a concept of experimental impartiality with the sole 
purpose of re-appraising the current historiography of British clinical trials. This 
concept should stand a defence on its own, but I just want the reader to accept it for the 
sake of the subsequent analysis. My goal is to show that a more precise understanding 
of the concept allows a more optimist epistemic analysis of the processes categorized by 
Porter, illustrating it with the case of British trials. Suffice it to say that in my approach 
I am drawing on two sources: the epistemology of experimental error, of which 
subjective biases are just an instance; and the tradition of fair medical tests extensively 
documented in the James Lind Library (and articulated most prominently by Iain 
Chalmers)2.   
In this approach, an experiment will be impartial if it incorporates 
methodological devices preventing the experimenter from manipulating the results at 
will. A case in point that we will use as an illustration throughout this paper is 
randomization in the allocation of treatments. In comparative clinical trials, a random 
allocation of therapies prevents the experimenter to assign treatments to patients in a 
way that may bias the experimental outcome. If, for instance, a researcher wants to 
increase the chances of an experimental drug to succeed in a trial, with a view to 
earning a bonus if it is ever approved for commercial use, allocating the therapy to the 
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 The James Lind Library is an internet site “created to help people understand fair tests of treatments in 
health care”: see  http://www.jameslindlibrary.org/ (Accessed October 23th, 2012) 
  
healthier group of patients in the trial will do it. As a debiasing method, randomization 
protects the experimental outcome from manipulation in the allocation of treatments. 
Impartiality comes in degrees then. The more complete it is our catalogue of 
potential biases and debiasing methods, the more impartial our experimental procedure 
will be. But there is no such thing as full impartiality, because with each change in the 
design or implementation of the experiment a new potential source of biases emerge. 
Besides, notice that debiasing methods only warrant the impartiality of the experimental 
procedure, not the impartiality of the outcome itself. On the one hand, even if the 
experiment is conducted without any manipulation whatsoever, the results may benefit 
the interests of one of the concerned parties: the experimental drug may work in a trial 
to the great joy of the manufacturer. I contend that we should still consider the 
experiment impartial, since the benefits derived from the outcome did not condition in 
any way the experimental procedure. In other words, the external (commercial) interest 
driving the experiment are perfectly compatible with the internal (epistemic) interests 
underlying the experimental procedure3. 
On the other hand, our warrants may fail, even without intentional manipulation: 
what if, for instance, the younger patients get the experimental treatment by sheer 
chance? This is just another instance of the so-called experimenter’s regress. Biases are 
just another kind of experimental error and there is no way to check whether our 
debiasing procedures actually work without implementing checking procedures that 
may themselves work or not. As I have argued elsewhere (Teira forthcoming), this is 
why the impartiality of the procedure counts: if we agree on a list of possible biases and 
the experiment implements methods to block them, this provides a good enough 
justification to accept the result as impartial. Were we to obtain a biased outcome 
nonetheless, it would not be the product of intentional manipulation.  
We should distinguish then between the procedural fairness of an experiment 
and the self-proclaimed impartiality of scientific experts. Whereas the former is 
warranted by the debiasing methods implemented in the experiment, the impartiality of 
expert judgment as such is far more complicated to establish. Mainly, because we still 
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 For an extended discussion of how these internal and external approaches might be reconciled from a 
contractarian perspective, from which I am implicitly arguing, see Zamora 2002, 2006 for a quick 
presentation. 
  
lack a good (and complete) theory of cognitive biases that would allow us to correct 
them as we do in an experimental setting.  
Although Porter’s approach remains agnostic as to the actual impartiality of 
either the experts or the procedures under historical analysis and focuses mostly on how 
their purported impartiality is used rhetorically in order to promote particular interests. 
However, from a philosophical standpoint at least, I think it makes a difference whether 
there is something more to impartiality than mere persuasion: as we are going to discuss 
in the following section, if the British physicians testing drugs were acting in the name 
of impartiality but their experiments were not in fact impartial, it seems as if the British 
taxpayers who funded those tests and expected their decision would have been cheated. 
Perhaps the historian does not want to judge the case on epistemic or moral grounds, but 
the philosopher should at least make clear in what sense the experiments could be 
impartial for the lay reader to draw her conclusions. 
Finally, a word about our motivation to adopt impartial tests: why would anyone 
accept an experimental procedure that constrains our ability to manipulate it? We seem 
to have a taste for fair procedures, as documented in an extensive psychological 
literature about distribution processes. But we can also construct principled arguments 
to explain it in contractarian fashion –see Teira forthcoming. As we will see in the 
following two sections, every regulatory drug test should sort out a potential conflict of 
interests, since the concerned parties expect different things from the trial. The 
manufacturer wants quick access to the market, the patients want safe and effective 
compounds, the prescribing physicians do not want to be sued for it, etc. And they all 
should agree on the result of the trial instead of contesting it if it does not accord with 
their own preferences. As I have argued elsewhere, the impartiality of the test regarding 
their interests is a pre-requisite for them to accept the results. This is particularly 
relevant from a historical perspective, since it may explain why there was such a high 
demand for impartiality in drug testing and why RCTs were adopted as the regulatory 
standard. With this concept in sight, let me then proceed to the re-analysis of the process 
in which British RCTs emerged. Against the standard account, I hope to show that there 
was something more to their impartiality than mere rhetoric. 
  
3. EARLY BRITISH TRIALS 
Between 1900 and 1950 expert clinical judgment was the main approach in the 
assessment of the properties of pharmaceutical compounds in Britain. An experienced 
clinician would administer the drug to a series of patients he considered more apt to 
benefit from it. His conclusions would be presented as a case report, with the details of 
each patient’s reaction to the treatment. The alternatives were first laboratory 
experiments and then controlled clinical trials (from which RCTs would later emerge). 
The former would proceed either in vitro or in vivo (on animals and patients): 
considered superior by clinicians with a scientific background, its scope was usually 
restricted to safety considerations. It soon gave way to comparative trials, in which two 
treatments were alternated on the same patient or administered in two groups of patients 
(simultaneously or not). The arrangements to secure the comparability of the two 
treatments were the controls and they adopted different forms. The following items 
counted as controls in these trials: the patients’ eligibility criteria, the way treatments 
were allocated (alternation and randomization), uniformity in administration of 
treatments and patients’ blinding. They were not used necessarily all at once. Statistical 
reports from controlled trials conveyed their results with different degrees of 
sophistication. Significance testing features only occasionally before 1950.  
The assessment of medical therapies became an issue of general concern with 
the creation of the first public insurance schemes in the 1910s. With the implementation 
of the National Health Insurance Act, passed in Parliament in 1911, the health budget 
started to grow significantly. The British administration became a massive purchaser of 
drugs, increasing yearly its pharmaceutical expenses. In 1919 the Ministry of Health 
was created with the mission, among others, of controlling these expenses. A better 
management of this budget required discerning the most efficient drug on sale in the 
market. 
During its first decade, the Ministry resorted to various forms of clinical 
expertise to decide about the treatments to subsidize (for anti-tuberculosis treatments, 
for instance).  Gradually, the Medical Research Council began to establish itself as the 
leading public authority on drugs4. Originally created to conduct research on 
tuberculosis with funds provided by the NHI Act, its scope became wider after the First 
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 The standard sources on the MRC are the two volumes of Landsborough Thomson 1973 and Austoker 
& Bryder 1989 
  
World War. The MRC contributed then to prevent the distribution of defective 
salvarsan, a treatment for syphilis, among British troops, providing laboratory tests to 
check its purity5. The reputation thereby earned made the Ministry defer to the MRC the 
standardisation of “biologicals” of pharmaceutical use. This would be regulated in 1925 
with the Therapeutic Substances Act.  
Before 1925, the British pharmaceutical market was almost unregulated and, 
with just a small duty payment, everybody could sell as pharmaceutical products 
compounds of undisclosed nature, the so-called secret remedies. In case of nil or 
adverse effects it was difficult to adjudicate in court the responsibility of the producer 
without some sort of assessment of the composition and properties of the remedy. This 
led to all sorts of clinical tests, usually controversial in their results6. Among these 
controversies, the MRC gradually became the sole arbiter in drug assessment in Britain. 
According to Desirée Cox (1997), this was due, in a great deal, to the vision and 
determination of Walter Fletcher, its first secretary.  
Fletcher’s moral convictions about the impartial role of the civil servant 
informed the organization of the MRC during this period7. Fletcher believed that the 
MRC should contribute to the British common good through the disinterested 
investigations of its “noble scientists”. Unlike ordinary physicians, they should have a 
scientific education that allowed them to provide an objective assessment of the nature 
and efficacy of medical treatments. For the MRC scientists it was a moral duty to be 
objective: they were safeguarding the justice of the transactions in the British 
pharmaceutical market. This is, at least, what Fletcher wrote to the Lord President of the 
Privy Council, Arthur Balfour, in defence of the Therapeutic Substances Act: if the 
MRC verified that each compound was standardised in accordance to its purported 
therapeutic properties, the consumers (be they patients or doctors) could be certain they 
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 On the salvarsan study see Toth 1998, pp. 125-138. The indications provided by the MRC regarding the 
administration of the drug were based on case reports: see MRC 1920, pp. 27-33 
6
 For an illustration of these early clinical trials see Cox 1997, pp. 26-93. For the legal framework, see 
Abraham 1995, pp. 53-56. The Select Committee of the House of Commons had relied namely on 
laboratory tests in order to identify the composition of secret remedies for their 1914 report (Select 
Committee on Patent Medicines 1914, pp. 11-12). 
7
 The following account is based on Cox 1997, pp. 94-188. 
  
would get what they paid for. Standardisation would thus improve the safety of the 
consumers and the international sales prospects of the British pharmaceutical industry8. 
In order to guarantee the objectivity of the assessment, Fletcher organized the 
MRC trials in such a way as to prevent any conflict of either intellectual or economic 
interests. In exchange for the material support they would receive for each trial, these 
noble scientists should commit themselves to the research agenda set by the MRC and 
disclose whatever results they reached. In case there was a dispute about the priority in 
any finding, Fletcher would mediate. Making financial profits from trials was 
discouraged and Fletcher saw to it, excluding very qualified clinicians from the trials 
due to their potential stakes in their result. However, the MRC ideology of impartiality 
was not implemented in any methodological principles aimed at excluding personal 
biases. According to Cox, physicians “used these trials in the name of biological 
standardisation as opportunities to express their clinical prowess and demonstrate their 
individuality” (1997, p. 175).  
Clinical trials became more important in the 1930s when the Association of 
British Chemical Manufacturers (ABCM) approached the MRC demanding an external 
assessment of their products. At this point their sales were decreasing due to the effects 
of the Great Depression and rogue competition from small distributors who cut prices 
producing low quality drugs (Abraham 1995, pp. 53-54). According to the meeting’s 
record, the ABCM argued that British pharmaceutical companies could not get their 
remedies tested and approved by the medical community as was already happening in 
Germany: “doctors were afraid of publishing clinical trials of new drugs in this country 
lest they should be suspected of having a pecuniary interest in doing so” (Cox 1997, p. 
197). This request certainly suited the ideology of fairness that presided over the MRC: 
the Therapeutic Trials Committee (TTC) was formed in 1931 and a public 
announcement was made.  
The members of this committee were again “noble scientists”, who perceived 
themselves as “the disinterested juror, managing the interest of the pharmaceutical 
industry, the public, and the profession” (Cox 1997, p. 199). The TTC established a set 
of rules aimed at giving equal opportunities to all manufacturers who wished to test 
their products, provided their applications complied with certain conditions (e.g., 
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 For an international perspective on the British pharmaceutical industry, see Liebenau 1990. 
  
disclosure of the composition). Once accepted, the TTC would appoint external experts 
to conduct a trial. The manufacturer could not contact the expert during the test and 
should not arrange a separate trial until the TTC reached a conclusion. The TTC would 
decide on the publication of the results and only in this case could the manufacturer 
make public use of the trial (without naming the expert who conducted it). 
We may now wonder in what sense the trials supported this impartial judgment. 
Guidelines were established at a 1931 conference in which the MRC attempted to 
reorganize the multi-centre trial of the antipneumococcal serum against pneumonia 
(Edwards 2007, pp. 106-112). The approved “Standard scheme of inquiry” for this trial 
specified that patients should be allocated by alternation to a control group. According 
to Cox (1997, p. 206), this was the “uncontested position” of the TTC. Nonetheless, as 
Martin Edwards (2007, pp. 22-23) observes, the TTC never imposed a unified 
methodology for its trials. They were often case reports, and only a quarter of them used 
some sort of comparative control. Significance testing was used only in one of these 
studies (Snodgrass et al. 1937). 
In other words, expert clinical judgment was still the main criterion applied in 
the TTC trials. According to Toth, comparative trials were only advocated by the TTC 
“when a British drug was being compared to a foreign produced variant” (1998, p. 156). 
Martin Edwards (2007, p. 112) claims that the scheme was adopted in order to control 
the very idiosyncratic practices of the clinicians involved in the trial. In fact, the MRC 
paid no attention to the methodological flaws uncovered by Bradford Hill in the 
allocation process of the lobar pneumonia trial (MRC 1934) and never corrected them in 
any other test conducted during the 1930s9. On this basis, the standard account of the 
TTC trials concludes that there wasn’t any real understanding of the epistemic 
properties of a fair test in the MRC: when such tests were implemented it was more as a 
means to achieve non-epistemic goals. The same applies to the ideology of fairness 
promoted by Fletcher: as Cox (1997) shows in detail, the MRC allowed exceptions to its 
own rules if more mundane considerations advised it. In Cox’s account, impartiality, be 
it methodological or moral, was mainly a rhetorical tool for the MRC to establish itself 
as the sole voice for medical research during this period.  
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 The alternation of treatments have produced unbalanced groups in respect of age, which turned out to be 
a variable correlated with the effect of the serum. See Chalmers 2002 and Edwards 2007, pp. 93-119 for 
comments on this trial. 
  
In my view, the evidence available allows for a more charitable epistemic 
interpretation. We need to separate the impartiality of the expert from the impartiality of 
the trial. As to the former, it was clearly admitted by all parties that there was a source 
of subjective bias: the commercial interests of the pharmaceutical manufacturers. 
Fletcher tried to warrant the impartiality of his experts cutting all their financial ties to 
the industry10. However, there seem to have been diverging views within the MRC team 
about selection biases from non-economic sources. To put it bluntly, even if a minority 
desired to avoid them (through the “Standard scheme of inquiry”), a majority of the 
MRC sponsored clinicians considered themselves perfectly capable of conducting a trial 
and interpreting its results impartially. In other words, they considered themselves 
impervious to every other type of bias –as most of us still do, according to current 
psychological research –see, e.g., Dana 2009. They might have been wrong, but nobody 
questioned the principle that biases should be prevented. Hence, the MRC clinicians did 
not see the necessity of constraining their studies with debiasing procedures.  
We should also separate the impartiality of the MRC trials from the partiality of 
the goals they served. For instance, establishing the MRC as the British authority on 
drugs. As Daniel Carpenter has argued regarding the American Food and Drug 
Administration “there is nothing inherently ‘selfish’ or ‘inefficient’ about reputation 
protection” (Carpenter 2004, p. 54). If the MRC tried to establish itself as the sole 
arbiter of British trials it is just because this reputation would allow them to “more 
easily attract desired personnel; fend off budget cuts; and lobby for the programs, funds, 
and other things they desire” (ibid.)11. This is not incompatible per se with the 
impartiality of the MRC trials. Only a manipulation of these tests with a view to 
promoting the goals of the sponsoring body would have breached their impartiality. 
4. THE STREPTOMYCIN TRIAL 
By the end of the 1930s there seems to have been widespread agreement within 
the British medical community about the necessity of impartiality in trials, although 
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 Even if the MRC made exceptions to its own rules regarding the independence of trials from the 
industry, this does not imply that the principle of impartiality was questioned. Social norms do not need 
to be systematically obeyed to remain valid: as empirical studies show, compliance is never complete –
see Bicchieri 2006 for an overview. If the exception had become the rule, the reputation of the TTC 
would have collapsed at some point, which apparently never happened.  
11
 For an extensive discussion of the role of reputation in the analysis of regulatory agencies, see 
Carpenter 2010, pp. 33-70. 
  
with no consensus as to its practical requirements. This consensus began to emerge after 
the war on one particular debiasing procedure, randomization, after it was implemented 
in the famous British Streptomycin trial. Again, the standard interpretation of the trial 
suggests that randomization provided just an appearance of impartiality. Applying the 
distinctions presented in section 2, I will defend that randomization in the 
Streptomycing trial was as impartial as we may expect. But let me first put this trial in 
context. 
In 1943 Alfred Schatz and Selman Waksman, at Rutgers University, established 
that an antibiotic substance produced by the actinomycetes Streptomyces griseus halted 
the growth of various bacteria in vitro. Soon it was tested on M tuberculosis and by 
1945 the first study on the use of streptomycin in human tuberculosis was published. 
Merck started to manufacture it and in 1946 a large multi-centre trial was conducted by 
the Veterans Administration in collaboration with the US Public Health Service, the 
National Research Council and the National Tuberculosis Association. Due to the short 
amount of streptomycin available, this first streptomycin trial was not randomized in 
order to maximize the number of patients receiving the drug. The majority of them 
improved from their lesions, though there were adverse effects and signs of the bacteria 
developing resistance to the drug. In 1947 these preliminary results were published and 
guidelines set on the therapeutic use of streptomycin. Further trials were called for12. 
Though the production (and commercial success) of streptomycin multiplied 
tenfold in a couple of years, these figures could not be matched in Britain until 1948, 
despite the licensing agreements. However, early in 1946 the MRC was expressing 
interest in the drug only to find the opposition of the Ministry of Health that feared 
public demand for the drug at a time it could not be met. However, expressions of 
public interest in the drug were already arriving at the Ministry. The National Health 
System had just been created and one of its founding principles, stated in the Beveridge 
Report, established that every British citizen was entitled to receive whatever available 
treatments were needed13. Did this principle apply to streptomycin? Again, for the 
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 See Yoshioka 1998a, pp. 18-35 and Toth 1998, pp. 222-248. 
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 “A comprehensive national health service will ensure that for every citizen there is available whatever 
medical treatment he requires, in whatever form he requires it, domiciliary or institutional, general, 
specialist or consultant, and will ensure also the provision of dental, ophthalmic and surgical appliances, 
nursing and midwifery and rehabilitation after accidents” (Beveridge, 1942, p. 158). See Toth 1998, pp. 
232-234 and Yoshioka 1998a, pp. 40-42 for comments.  
  
Ministry of Health the issue was whether this new drug was effective enough to deserve 
the investment and the MRC was commissioned to carry out a clinical trial. 
In July 1946, the main decisions about the streptomycin trial were adopted in a 
series of meetings organized by the MRC: the types of tuberculosis and patients to be 
treated, the participating hospitals and laboratories and the methodology of the trial14. 
For the main group of patients in the trial (which finally would be those suffering from 
“acute, rapidly progressive, bilateral pulmonary tuberculosis of recent development, 
unsuitable for collapse therapy, bacteriologically proven, age limits 15-30”) it was 
agreed that a double-blind trial with untreated control cases was necessary15. All the 
other trials were planned without this methodological proviso. Randomization is 
mentioned just once in the archival record (Yoshioka 1998a, pp. 177-178). The minutes 
of the meetings do not provide therefore many insights about the methodological 
discussion within the MRC, had there been any. 
In 1947, once the doses were secured, the Streptomycin in Tuberculosis Trials 
Committee conducted the different tests. The patients received treatment between four 
and six months: admission started in January and ended in September. The number of 
patients in the pulmonary tuberculosis trial considered in the final report was 107. In 
September 1948, a draft paper on the trial written by M. Daniels and P. D’Arcy Hart 
was thoroughly discussed by the Committee and sent for publication in the October 30th 
issue of the British Medical Journal.  
In the paper we find a quick defence of the need for controls, given the 
variability in the natural course of the disease. The most cited passage is probably the 
presentation of the randomizing procedure (“The Control Scheme”): 
Determination of whether a patient would be treated by streptomycin and bed-rest (S 
case) or by bed-rest alone (C case) was made by reference to a statistical series based on 
random sampling numbers drawn up for each sex at each centre by Professor Bradford 
Hill; the details of the series were unknown to any of the investigators or to the co-
ordinator and were contained in a set of sealed envelopes, each bearing on the outside 
only the name of the hospital and a number. After acceptance of a patient by the panel, 
and before admission to the streptomycin centre, the appropriate numbered envelope 
was opened at the central office the card inside told if the patient was to be an S or a C 
case, and this information was then given to the medical officer of the centre. Patients 
were not told before admission that they were to get special treatment. C patients did 
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 See Yoshioka 1998a, pp. 165-186. 
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 Given the length of the trial, the idea of using a placebo for the control group (injections of an inert 
substance) “was felt to be impractical” by the planners (Yoshioka 1998a, p. 176). 
  
not know throughout their stay in hospital that they were control patients in a special 
study; they were in fact treated as they would have been in the past, the sole difference 
being that they had been admitted to the centre more rapidly than was normal. Usually 
they were not in the same wards as S patients, but the same regime was maintained. 
(MRC 1948, p. 770)16 
The other statistical feature of the trial, the use of significance tests, is not so 
often discussed. The trial had been planned, claim the authors, to answer the question 
“Is streptomycin of value in the treatment of pulmonary tuberculosis?” (MRC 1948, p. 
780). The main criterion to decide about the efficacy of the drug was a comparison 
between chest radiographs of the patients at the beginning and at the end of the trial. 
Interestingly enough, there is no explanation of the statistical rationale of either 
randomization or significance testing –this latter is only clarified with occasional 
allusions to the probability of a difference between two percentages occurring by 
chance17. However, the streptomycin trial is usually considered a landmark in the 
history of statistics in medicine: after centuries of medical resistance to statistical 
thinking, the epistemic weight of Fisher’s case for randomized experiments would have 
persuaded at least a minority of enlightened clinicians to implement the first solid RCT. 
Thereafter, it would become a paradigm for trialists all over the world18.  
Against this interpretation we find again an alternative approach focused on the 
worldly interests that pervaded the streptomycin trial, namely defended by Alan 
Yoshioka and Benjamin Toth. According to Yoshioka (1998a, p.185), the scientists 
involved in the trial “treated research as a means to achieve administrative ends” and, in 
retrospect, we may conclude they did it efficiently (pp. 223-224). As for Toth (1998, p. 
252), the streptomycin trial methodology “does not so much reflect the interests of the 
groups involved as help to shape the relationships between the groups”. In other words, 
it was not the epistemic weight of any statistical argument that made this trial a 
landmark RCT: the methodology was chosen because it was instrumental for the 
achievement of more mundane ends. Had it not been conducive to those ends, a 
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 Notice, though, that the trial was not blinded. 
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 In the 1948 volume of the British Medical Journal we find 18 mentions of the phrase “statistically 
significant” (including the MRC streptomycin paper). Since 1840, the phrase had appeared in 153 
occasions, the first one in 1904 and the rest of them after 1927. The calculation is rarely provided. 
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 See the collection of acknowledgments compiled in Yoshioka 1998a, p. 182, n. 123 and p. 183, n. 126. 
The success of the trial owed more to its methodology than to the actual effects of the treatment: further 
studies showed that the early improvement detected in the 1948 trial did not necessarily indicate a better 
long-term prognosis: Florey 1961, pp. 132-133. I owe this reference to Donald Gillies.  
  
different methodology might have been chosen. Let us briefly discuss this case 
examining the interests of each party involved in the trial.  
As the archival record shows, from September 1945 through December 1946 the 
public was expressing more and more interest about streptomycin, requesting 
information and access to the new drug from the British authorities (Yoshioka 1998a, 
pp. 45-89). The only way to meet this demand was importing doses from the United 
States. From the point of view of the Ministry of Health, the goals were, on the one 
hand, to avoid wasting the scarce supplies available treating the wrong patients and, on 
the other hand, to avoid rationing, still darkly associated to the War years. According to 
Yoshioka (1998a, p.90), the Ministry decided to manage the situation allocating all the 
available doses to a clinical trial, in which economic or political influence gave no 
priority access to the drug. In order to justify this test, the Ministry fabricated a “toxicity 
scare” about streptomycin (Yoshioka 1998a, p. 92), stating time and again that its 
therapeutic value was still uncertain. Still according to Yoshioka (1998a), this was a 
manipulation of public opinion, since the certainties accumulated about the drug in 
America were enough to justify its mass production and this was acknowledged in 
private by the Ministry officers.  
As for the MRC, to quote Yoshioka, it made a careful use of “its scientific 
expertise and credibility in order to achieve its institutional goals in the scramble for 
resources” (Yoshioka 1998a, p. 95). In other words, establishing itself as the British sole 
arbiter on drug assessment. The methodology of the trial allowed the MRC to exert a 
centralized control on the administration of the drug, preventing British clinicians from 
choosing the patients who would receive it –this was their methodology of choice, as we 
saw in the previous section. However, in this case, it might have been well received by 
the medical profession, since it relieved the clinician from the responsibility of selecting 
patients: despite the Ministry, the drug was thought a life-saving treatment and it was 
certainly hard to refuse it to a patient (Yoshioka 1998a, 178-179)19. Finally, regarding 
the pharmaceutical industry, no manufacturer in Britain was in a position to benefit 
from streptomycin production at the time of the trial, and their production plans were 
mostly decided by the MRC at its own convenience (Yoshioka 1997, pp. 94-127).  
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 This is an argument advanced in the editorial note that accompanied the publication of the trial in the 
British Medical Journal. 
  
All these mundane interests would have driven the organization of the 
streptomycin trial: randomization was only used because it suited all parties involved, 
be it for the purposes of rationing, control or relief of responsibility, but not for any 
appreciation of its statistical value. The lack of epistemic weight of statistics in this trial 
can be inferred from the archival record, since there is no mention of randomization in 
the minutes of the meetings in which the trial was planned and just occasional allusions 
in a few related documents. Moreover, Bradford Hill only joined the actual discussions 
once the main methodological issues had been decided, so he could not possibly 
rehearse any Fisherian argument to inspire the trial (and very few would have been able 
to understand him). The use of statistical controls would have been mostly rhetoric, 
conclude in different ways Toth (1998) and Edwards (2007) 
I disagree with this conclusion. Again we should distinguish between two 
separate epistemic dimensions in this trial: the control for biases, on the one hand, and 
the statistical interpretation of the result, on the other hand. Iain Chalmers (2005) has 
argued indeed that Bradford Hill was not following Fisher’s theory about the statistical 
design of experiments when he prepared his “control scheme” for the streptomycin trial. 
He was just concerned with concealing the way treatments were allocated among the 
clinicians in charge of recruiting patients. This way, no conscious or unconscious 
selection of patients would bias the test. Hill’s concern was shared by other members of 
the committee (such as P. D’Arcy Hart and G. Scadding) who had used alternation for 
the same purpose in the 1944 patulin trial (Chalmers & Clarke 2004). In sum, the 
epistemic weight of the control scheme lay mostly in the warrant provided of the 
fairness of the trial, not in the statistical weight of the conclusions. Bradford Hill was 
certainly a pioneer in medical statistics, but we may suspect that had he appealed to 
significance tests alone, he would not have found much support for the streptomycin 
trial. 
Even if the control scheme was instrumental in respect of different practical 
goals, we should notice that achieving these goals depended on the impartiality of the 
control scheme. For all parties involved the more serious problem seems to have been 
how to allocate a scarce good (streptomycin). The standard solution in many different 
social settings is to organize a lottery, whose fairness depends on the chances you have 
of getting an equal share of the good (Stone 2007). For the Ministry of Health and the 
British patients randomization might have seem just one such lottery: as long as it was 
  
unbiased (i.e., chances are evenly distributed among the participants) it is acceptable20. 
By the same token, we may well understand that the clinician was relieved of any 
personal responsibility in the choice of treatment: all the patients in the trial were 
equally entitled to receive streptomycin and they all had the same chance of getting it. If 
the practical goal to be achieved was the distribution of a scarce good without 
controversy, not every allocation scheme could have been used, but just fair 
mechanisms. In RCTs the social fairness of the allocation procedure goes hand in hand 
with its epistemic weight: the more impartial it is, the better it will prevent biases. 
5. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
In this paper, I have tried to show that a number of British landmark trials 
between 1930 and 1950 were more impartial than the standard historical account 
suggests. In my view, this account depends on an objectionable concept of impartiality, 
quite popular in social studies of statistical methods after Porter (1996). I think that 
Porter’s main claim is correct: the intervention of the British health authorities in the 
pharmaceutical market was acceptable to the different stakeholders (pharmaceutical 
manufacturers, patients, physicians…) to the extent it appeared impartial. However, we 
should be more precise in the definition of this concept, if we want to explain why the 
results of MRC trials came to define a public standard in drug testing. 
We should distinguish in the first place the impartiality of the expert and the 
impartiality of the trial. Whereas there is no clear consensus, still today, about how to 
warrant the former, early in the 1930s emerged a view about the necessity of 
experimental fairness, as defined, for instance, in the “Standard scheme of inquiry”. A 
test would only be impartial if it incorporated debiasing procedures that prevented self-
interested manipulations of the outcome. The Streptomycin trial showed how 
randomization provided one such warrant of impartiality, enough to create a social 
consensus on the experiment. The difficulty of finding similar warrants for simple 
expert judgment may probably explain why the mechanical objectivity of trials came to 
prevail in regulatory decisions.  
However, trials can be put to a strategic use, as the British tests show: be it the 
promotion of national compounds, discipline clinicians through the research protocol or 
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 In The Times, October 29th, 1948, p. 2. we read for instance: “To remove every possibility of bias each 
patient’s group was decided by a statistician using an ingenious system of sealed envelopes”. 
  
delay the introduction of a drug in the market. My claim is that such partial use of trials 
will only damage their impartiality if the research protocol is manipulated to meet those 
goals. I do not find evidence in any of the accounts discussed about such manipulations. 
Hence, I conclude that an alternative interpretation is at least defensible: the adoption of 
randomized clinical trials as a regulatory yardstick was propelled by the warrants of 
impartiality they gradually incorporated (e.g., blinding, pre-established rules of 
interpretation of their results [significance testing], etc.). The implementation of these 
warrants does not imply that the outcome will be unbiased. But, as far as we can discern 
today, they fared better than any alternative testing procedure in use till then.  
The current design of RCTs was shaped in a process in which the public demand 
for impartiality in drug tests was growing. As the late Harry Marks (2000) argued, by 
the 1940s the pharmaceutical industry was deeply mistrusted by the public: commercial 
and scientific interests were deemed contradictory and RCTs were supposed to 
reconcile them. If we accept the concept of impartiality suggested in this paper, I think 
epistemic reasons will contribute as much as particular interests to explain the history of 
this process21. 
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